Evolution in group-structured populations can resolve the tragedy of the commons by Killingback, Timothy et al.
Proc. R. Soc. B (2006) 273, 1477–1481
doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.3476Evolution in group-structured populations can
resolve the tragedy of the commons
Timothy Killingback1,*, Jonas Bieri2 and Thomas Flatt3
1Department of Mathematics, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187, USA
2Zoology Institute, University of Basel, Rheinsprung 9, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
3Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Brown University, Box G-W, Providence RI 02912, USA





AcceptedPublic goods are the key features of all human societies and are also important in many animal societies.
Collaborative hunting and collective defence are but two examples of public goods that have played a
crucial role in the development of human societies and still play an important role in many animal societies.
Public goods allow societies composed largely of cooperators to outperform societies composed mainly of
non-cooperators. However, public goods also provide an incentive for individuals to be selfish by benefiting
from the public good without contributing to it. This is the essential paradox of cooperation—known
variously as the Tragedy of the Commons, Multi-person Prisoner’s Dilemma or Social Dilemma. Here, we
show that a new model for evolution in group-structured populations provides a simple and effective
mechanism for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in such a social dilemma. This model does
not depend on kin selection, direct or indirect reciprocity, punishment, optional participation or trait-
group selection. Since this mechanism depends only on population dynamics and requires no cognitive
abilities on the part of the agents concerned, it potentially applies to organisms at all levels of complexity.
Keywords: evolution of cooperation; group-structured populations; public goods game;
tragedy of the commons1. INTRODUCTION
Achieving a satisfactory understanding of the evolution of
cooperation in social dilemmas is fundamental for
elucidating many important problems in biology and the
social sciences, such as the stability of human and animal
societies and the sustainability of public resources
(Hamilton 1964; Hardin 1968; Wilson 1975b; Axelrod
& Hamilton 1981; Alexander 1987; Berkes et al. 1989;
Frank 1998; Richerson & Boyd 1998; Ostrom et al. 1999).
Social dilemmas also emerge in many other key problems
in biology, including the major transitions in evolution
(Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1995), the evolution of pre-
biotic replicators (Eigen & Schuster 1979), viral evolution
(Turner & Chao 1999) and the evolution of metabolic
pathways (Pfeiffer et al. 2001).
Many theoretical and experimental investigations of
cooperative behaviour have employed public goods games
as simple models of social dilemmas (Ledyard 1995;
Gintis 2000; Fehr & Gachter 2002; Hauert et al. 2002;
Milinski et al. 2002; Semmann et al. 2003). Public goods
games capture the essential features of social dilemmas—
groups of cooperators outperform groups of non-coop-
erators, but selfish individuals always do better than
cooperators in their group (Gintis 2000). In a typical
public goods game (Ledyard 1995), an experimenter gives
each of the four subjects an endowment of £10. Each
player is offered the opportunity to invest some or all of
their £10 in a common pool. The experimenter thenctronic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.
098/rspb.2006.3476 or via http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.
r for correspondence (tpkill@wm.edu).
11 October 2005
12 January 2006
1477collects the money in the pool, doubles it and divides it
equally among the four individuals. Game theory predicts
that, since each £1 invested yields a return of £0.50 to the
investor, no one should ever contribute to the common
pool. This situation is a social dilemma—if no one
contributes to the common pool then each individual
keeps their initial endowment of £10, however, if all
individuals contribute their £10 endowment to the pool
then they each end up with £20. In public goods
experiments, the initial high level of investment drops
quickly to low levels (Ledyard 1995). High levels of
investment can be maintained by allowing individuals to
punish non-cooperators (Fehr & Gachter 2002), by the
need for individuals to maintain a good reputation
(Milinski et al. 2002) or by including optional partici-
pation in the game (Hauert et al. 2002; Semmann et al.
2003).
Here, we focus on a simple alternative mechanism in
which evolutionary dynamics in a group-structured
population results in the evolution of high levels of
cooperative investment, which are maintained indefinitely.
This mechanism is fundamentally distinct from previous
approaches for studying the evolution of cooperation in
group-structured populations which have depended on
kin selection (Maynard Smith 1964; Wade 1985; Queller
1992; Taylor 1992a,b; Wilson et al. 1992; West et al. 2002;
Rousset 2004), classical group selection (Maynard Smith
1964; Wilson 1975a), trait-group selection (Wilson
1975a, 1980) or spatial game theory (Nowak & May
1992; Killingback et al. 1999). In addition, our model does
not depend on the agents having any capacity to recognize
other agents or remember past actions, which is essential
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being able to opt out of the public goods game, which is
crucial for mechanisms based on volunteering (Hauert










0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000


















Figure 1. Simulation results for the evolution of cooperation
in the public goods game in a single well-mixed population of
100 individuals, with a maximum investment level of VZ5.
(a) kZ90; (b) kZ110. All individuals in the population
participate in the public goods game. The fitness of each
individual is calculated as described in the text. Individuals
reproduce in proportion to their fitness, subject to the
condition that the total population size remains constant.
During reproduction mutations can occur, which change the
investment level of the offspring. In both cases cooperative
investments evolve to 0. Initial investments were chosen
uniformly randomly between 0 and 5. The mutation rate was
0.01, and mutations were randomly picked from a normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance 0.01.2. MODEL AND RESULTS
We use the following public goods game to study the
evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We assume
that n individuals each make an investment xi in a public
good, where each xi (iZ1,., n) is a real number between
0 and some positive maximum value V. The payoff to
individual i is given by Eðxi; xÞZ ðk=nÞ
Pn
jZ1 xjKxi, where k
is a positive constant (which can be viewed as the ‘interest
rate’), and xZ ðx1;.; xnÞ denotes the strategy profile of the
individuals in the group. The first term in this expression
represents the benefit that the individual gets from the
public good, while the second term represents the cost of
making the investment. This definition extends the notion
of a public goods game that is used in experimental
situations to a general game with continuous investments.
In our formulation of the public goods game, we have
assumed that the interest rate k is a constant, independent
of the group size n. This is a standard assumption in work
on the public goods game: however, we note that, in
principle, we could also consider a variant of our model in
which k depends on n. We also note that in our
formulation of the game the strategy is an arbitrary real
number between 0 and V. This definition extends the
standard discrete strategy public goods game. In principle,
it is also possible to consider more complex strategies that
depend explicitly on the group size n, but we will not do
this here.
Since the payoff can be written as Eðxi; xÞZ ðk=nÞP
1%jsi%n xjKð1Kðk=nÞÞxi, it is clear that, for 1!k!n,
every individual will maximize its payoff by making zero
investment, irrespective of the investments made by the
other individuals (i.e. for 1!k!n defection is the
dominant strategy). However, if all the players make
zero investment, they each receive a payoff E0Z0, while if
every player instead investedV they would each receive the
larger payoff EVZ(kK1)V. This is a social dilemma:
groups of cooperators outperform groups of non-coop-
erators, but it is always individually advantageous to cheat
by not cooperating.
For 1!k!n, the public goods game is a social dilemma
and zero investment is the individually optimal strategy.
More generally, if the public goods game is considered as
an evolutionary game (Maynard Smith 1982), then
selection will always result in individuals making zero
investment, even for kOn. This follows from the fact that,
in any group, for any k, low investors obtain a greater
payoff than higher investors. In the evolutionary context,
we consider a population ofN individuals, each making an
investment xi. We assume that all individuals in the
population participate in the public goods game. The
fitness of individual i is taken to be W ðxiÞZVCEðxi ; xÞ,
which is always positive. We assume that individuals
reproduce in proportion to their fitness, subject to the
condition that the total population size remains constant.
During reproduction mutations can occur, which change
the investment level of the offspring. If we denote the
lowest investing strategy in the population by xi then, since
W ðxiÞOW ðxjÞ, for all jsi, strategy xi will go to fixation.
Proc. R. Soc. B (2006)Consequently, the average level of investment in the
population will evolve to zero as selection consistently
favours lower investing mutants. Evolutionary simulations
confirm this result (see figure 1).
Since cooperation cannot evolve in the public goods
game in a well-mixed population, it is important to
consider the effect of other population structures. In
many social situations, individuals do not interact with all
members of the population in every generation—rather, in
a given generation, individuals only interact socially with a
sub-group of the population. Consider now the total
population to be composed of m disjoint interaction sub-
groups. We assume that each individual in the population
obtains a payoff by playing the public goods game with the
other individuals in its interaction group. We also assume
that individuals compete with all other individuals in the
population. Thus, social interactions are local, while
competition is global. We implement the assumption of
global competition by having individuals reproduce in their
group in proportion to their fitness, subject to the
condition that the total population size remains constant.
To achieve this constraint on the total population size we
allow individuals to reproduce in their group (in pro-
portion to their fitness) and then rescale the size of all
groups tomaintain a constant total population size. During
reproduction occasional mutations occur, which change
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Figure 2. Simulation results for the evolution of cooperation
in a population of 500 individuals, subdivided into 100
interaction groups. (a) kZ2; (b) kZ3. Each individual in the
population obtains a payoff by playing the public goods game
with the other individuals in its interaction group, as
described in the text. Individuals reproduce in their group
in proportion to their fitness, subject to the condition that the
total population size remains constant. During reproduction
occasional mutations can occur, which change the investment
level of the offspring. Finally, a fraction d of the individuals in
each group disperses randomly to the other groups in the
population (this is achieved by giving each individual a
probability d of dispersing to another randomly chosen
group). Initially all groups are of equal size, containing five
individuals, so the public goods game in each group is a social
dilemma. Starting from low initial values, cooperative
investments evolve to high values, which are maintained
indefinitely. The dispersal rate was set to dZ0.1, and initial
investments were chosen uniformly randomly between 0 and



































Figure 3. Asymptotic level of cooperative investment after
100 000 generations as a function of dispersal rate d, for a
population of 500 individuals, subdivided into 100 inter-
action groups. (a) kZ2; (b) kZ3. In both cases, there exists a
region of dispersal values for which high levels of cooperative
investment evolve, and are maintained indefinitely. We note
that cooperation breaks down both at high d and at very low
(but non-zero) values of d. Results shown are from 10
replicate simulations; initial investments were chosen uni-
formly randomly between 0 and 0.5. All other parameters as
in figure 1.
Evolution of cooperation T. Killingback and others 1479of the individuals in each group disperses randomly to the
other groups in the population. We assume that initially all
groups are of equal size, containing nOk individuals, so the
public goods game in each group is a social dilemma. We
also assume that, if any group consists of only a single
individual, then this individual does not play the public
goods game, and receives zero payoff.
Despite its simple definition, it is not easy to study this
group-structured model analytically. Thus, our investi-
gation is based on extensive evolutionary simulations
(source code available in the electronic supplementary
material). Our simulations show that the evolution of
cooperation in such a group-structured population can be
dramatically different from that in a well-mixed popu-
lation and that with such a population structure sub-
stantial cooperative investments can readily evolve from
low initial levels and be maintained indefinitely. Typical
simulation results are shown in figure 2. The following
mechanism is responsible for the evolution of cooperation
in the group-structured situation. The combination of
reproduction within groups and limited random dispersalProc. R. Soc. B (2006)among groups results in groups of varying size (although
the mean group size remains constant at n). For certain
parameter values the variation is such that groups with
fewer than k individuals form. In such groups, the public
goods game is no longer a social dilemma, in that zero
investment is no longer the dominant strategy. Although
lower investors always have greater fitness than higher
investors, in any given group, it is now possible that
Simpson’s paradox (Sober & Wilson 1999; Hauert et al.
2002) applies—the fitness of higher investors, when
averaged over all groups, will be greater than that of
lower investors—and higher investors will increase in
frequency. Thus, interaction and reproduction within
groups, together with limited dispersal among groups,
results in a natural mechanism for the evolution of
cooperation. The exact range of dispersal values for
which cooperation is maintained depends on the par-
ameters in the model. We find that there exists a significant
region of dispersal values for which cooperation evolves for
a wide variety of parameter choices (see figure 3).3. DISCUSSION
The model that we have proposed here for evolution in
group-structured populations provides a simple new
mechanism for the origin and maintenance of cooperation
in public goods situations, which differs in important ways
from others that have been proposed. The main estab-
lished approaches to study the evolution of cooperation in
1480 T. Killingback and others Evolution of cooperationgroup-structured populations are kin selection in sub-
divided populations (Maynard Smith 1964; Wade 1985;
Queller 1992; Taylor 1992a,b; Wilson et al. 1992; West
et al. 2002; Rousset 2004), classical group selection
(Maynard Smith 1964; Nunney 1985; Wilson 1987,
1990), trait-group selection (Wilson 1975a, 1979, 1980)
and spatial game theory (Nowak &May 1992; Killingback
et al. 1999). We will briefly discuss the differences between
our model and these approaches.
First, it is clear that, in general, our model is quite
different from trait-group models, in which trait-groups of
equal size are completely reformed in each generation
(Wilson 1975a, 1980). Moreover, it is important to note
that trait-group selection does not result in the evolution
of cooperation in public goods situations if the groups are
formed strictly randomly (Wilson 1975a, 1980). In order
for cooperation to evolve in trait-group models it must be
assumed that, although the groups are formed anew in
each generation, there is some essential source of non-
randomness in their composition (Wilson 1975a, 1980).
We recover this result in the dZ1 limit of our model
(which can be regarded as being similar to a trait-group
model with randomly formed groups) where cooperation
does not evolve (see figure 3).
It is also clear that our model is very different from
classical group selection models (Maynard Smith 1964;
Nunney 1985; Wilson 1987, 1990), as selection acts
purely at the individual level in our model.
Another class of group-structured models that has been
considered involves kin selection in a subdivided popu-
lation (Wade 1982; Queller 1992; Taylor 1992a,b; Wilson
et al. 1992; West et al. 2002; Rousset 2004). These models
typically assume that the total population is subdivided
into local populations, which are distributed over some
spatial lattice, with limited dispersal taking place between
the different local populations. Whether such an approach
allows cooperation to evolve depends critically on the
detailed assumptions of the model. In many cases, the
negative effect of kin competition exactly cancels out the
positive effect of kin selection, hence preventing the
evolution of cooperation (Queller 1992; Taylor 1992a,b;
Wilson et al. 1992). It is, however, also possible to
formulate kin selection models in subdivided populations
that do allow the evolution of cooperation (for a good
discussion of the factors that facilitate the evolution of
cooperation in such models, see West et al. 2002).
Although it is possible for kin selection to facilitate the
evolution of cooperation, in situations such as the one we
are considering, kin selection alone cannot support
cooperation in our model. The mechanism at work in our
model is quite different: namely, reproduction in groups,
combined with dispersal between groups, results in
variations in group size, and for groups of sufficiently
small size, the public goods game is no longer a social
dilemma. Thus, it is possible, by Simpson’s paradox, for
high investors, when averaged over all groups, to have
greater fitness than low investors. This mechanism is clearly
quite distinct from kin selection. This distinction can be
explicitly tested by constructing a variant of our model in
which the public goods game is replaced by a game such as a
continuous version of the Multi-person Prisoner’s
Dilemma, which is a social dilemma for groups of any
size. In such a variant of our model, cooperation never
evolves (T. Killingback, J. Bieri & T. Flatt, unpublishedProc. R. Soc. B (2006)work). This is consistent with the fact that the mechanism
involving Simpson’s paradox cannot operate in the variant
model, even though kin selection should favour the
evolution of cooperation equally in both cases.
It is also apparent that the mechanism responsible for
the evolution of cooperation in our model is quite distinct
from that which occurs in spatial game theory models
(Nowak & May 1992; Killingback et al. 1999; Hauert &
Szabo´ 2003). Spatial game theory models of the evolution
of cooperation depend critically on the assumption that
each individual interacts only with its neighbours on a
spatial lattice (Nowak & May 1992; Killingback et al.
1999; Hauert & Szabo´ 2003). In contrast to these models,
our group-structured model does not involve any notions
of spatial structure—such as spatial neighbours or spatial
dimension—all that is required is that the population
consists of coherent groups (which can result from various
mechanisms, such as social organization).
Finally, we note that direct (Trivers 1971) or indirect
(Nowak & Sigmund 1998; Milinski et al. 2002) recipro-
city, or punishment (Fehr & Gachter 2002), are not
involved in the maintenance of cooperation in our model,
since we have not assumed that the individuals playing the
game have any capacity for individual recognition or
memory. Since we do not assume that individuals can opt
out of the public goods game, it is also evident that
volunteering (Hauert et al. 2002; Semmann et al. 2003) is
not the mechanism at work here (although Simpson’s
paradox also plays a key role in the maintenance of
cooperation through volunteering).
The model we have proposed for evolution in group-
structured populations provides a simple and effective
mechanism for promoting the evolution of cooperation in
social dilemmas such as the Tragedy of the Commons.
Biological populations are often structured in such a way
that individuals interact socially with other individuals in a
sub-group of the whole population, with dispersal
occurring between different sub-groups (Wilson 1975b):
consequently, the mechanism described here naturally
applies to a wide variety of human and animal societies.
One potentially interesting class of examples where this
mechanism may apply involves the common good
achieved by individuals maintaining their habitat in a
sanitary state and thereby reducing the prevalence of
infectious diseases. In a population subdivided into many
groups, each occupying a habitat, the payoff to individuals
investing in maintaining sanitary conditions may be higher
to those in small groups than to those in larger ones, since
many infectious diseases are less likely to be maintained in
a small population. Assuming that there is a modest degree
of dispersal between individuals in different groups, then
our mechanism may apply to such a situation, and would
suggest that investment in maintaining sanitary conditions
could evolve and be maintained throughout the
population.
Our mechanism may also work in conjunction with
other mechanisms, such as kin selection, to promote the
evolution of cooperation in group-structured populations.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that both our
mechanism and kin selection facilitate the evolution of
cooperation in a similar regime of dispersal values—
namely for reasonable low levels of dispersal. Moreover,
since our mechanism is based on population dynamics,
and does not require any cognitive abilities on the part of
Evolution of cooperation T. Killingback and others 1481the agents involved, it potentially applies to cooperative
behaviour at any level of complexity, from humans to
micro-organisms.
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